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Following the detection of an infectious disease outbreak, rapid epidemiological
assessment is critical for guiding an effective public health response.
To understand the transmission dynamics and potential impact of an outbreak,
several types of data are necessary. Here we build on experience gained in the
West African Ebola epidemic and prior emerging infectious disease outbreaks
to set out a checklist of data needed to: (1) quantify severity and transmissibility;
(2) characterize heterogeneities in transmission and their determinants; and (3)
assess the effectiveness of different interventions. We differentiate data needs
into individual-level data (e.g. a detailed list of reported cases), exposure data
(e.g. identifying where/how cases may have been infected) and population-
level data (e.g. size/demographics of the population(s) affected and when/
where interventions were implemented). A remarkable amount of individual-
level and exposure data was collected during theWest African Ebola epidemic,
which allowed the assessment of (1) and (2). However, gaps in population-level
data (particularly around which interventions were applied when and where)
posed challenges to the assessment of (3). Here we highlight recurrent data
issues, give practical suggestions for addressing these issues and discuss
priorities for improvements in data collection in future outbreaks.
This article is part of the themed issue ‘The 2013–2016 West African
Ebola epidemic: data, decision-making and disease control’.
1. Introduction
Detection of a new infectious disease outbreak requires rapid assessment of
both the clinical severity and the pattern of transmission to plan appropriate
response activities. Following the subsequent roll-out of interventions, contin-
ued evaluation is necessary to detect reductions in transmission and assess
the relative impact of different interventions. Surveillance data are crucial for
informing these analyses, and directly determine the extent to which they can
be performed.
Despite the unprecedented scale of the 2013–2016 West African Ebola epi-
demic [1,2], detailed data were collected during the outbreak, which proved
invaluable in guiding the response [3–10]. Multiple studies have already con-
sidered the lessons to be learned from the Ebola experience with respect to
& 2017 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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coordinating international responses to health crises, strength-
ening local health systems and improving clinical care and
surveillance tools [11–23]. Here we discuss what can be
learned to improve real-time epidemiological assessment in
future outbreaks via improved data collection and analyses,
building on similar contributions after other epidemics
[24–26]. We focus on efforts to reduce and interrupt trans-
mission. First, we outline analyses that are essential to inform
response activities during different stages of an epidemic.
Second, we detail the various types of data needed to perform
these analyses, with examples from the Ebola experience.
Third, we summarize the successes and challenges of data
collection experienced during this outbreak, and the impli-
cations this had for answering key public health questions.
Fourth, we suggest improvements that could be implemented
in future outbreaks, again drawing from the Ebola experience.
Finally, we discuss issues related to availability of data and
analyses (box 1).
2. Key public health questions and
corresponding analyses
Key public health questions for any emerging infectious dis-
ease outbreak are the following: (i) What is the likely public
health impact of the outbreak? (ii) How feasible is controlling
the outbreak and what interventions would be appropriate?
(iii) Are current interventions effective and could they be
improved? Here, we describe statistical and mathematical
analyses that facilitate epidemic response planning, focusing
on these questions (figure 1). In this section, we take a general
view, as these questions are recurring during most, if not all,
outbreaks. We provide examples from the West African Ebola
epidemic in subsequent sections.
(a) What is the likely public health impact of the
outbreak?
A key issue in the early phase of an epidemic is to determine
the potential impact of the outbreak in terms of clinical severity
and the likely total number of cases over different time periods.
(i) Severity
The severity of a pathogen is often characterized by the case
fatality ratio (CFR), the proportion of cases who die as a
result of their infection. Estimating theCFRduring an outbreak
can be challenging due to inconsistent case definitions, incom-
plete case reporting and right-censoring of data [27–29]. In
particular, it is critical to know the proportion of cases for
whom clinical outcome is unknown or has not been recorded,
which is typically easier to assess using detailed case data
rather than aggregated case counts [27]. The CFR may differ
across populations (e.g. age, space, treatment); quantifying
Box 1. Recommendations for collecting and using data for outbreak response.
1. Collecting relevant data
Data need to be collected at each of the three levels:
— individual level: detailed information about cases
— exposure level: information about exposure events that may have led to transmission
— population level: characteristics of the population(s) in which the outbreak is spreading and the interventions carried out
in the population(s)
Although some data will be context-specific, others, in particular at the population level, will be useful for a wide range of
epidemics, and should be routinely and centrally collected in preparation for the next outbreak.
2. Optimizing data quality
Having a general framework ready in advance of the next outbreak will facilitate:
— quality and timeliness of data
— centralization and harmonization of data at all three levels
— preparedness to deploy training material, personnel and logistical resources
There is substantial room for improvement in the quality of data collected in an epidemic context, particularly for emerging
pathogens.
3. Ensuring adequate data availability
Data need to be shared ensuring a balance between the following considerations:
— ethical: protecting anonymity while ensuring data are sufficiently detailed to be useful
— scientific: wide data access is desirable to promote independent analyses; however, mechanisms must be in place for
systematic comparison of results
— practical: deciding on a data format for sharing, on who will be responsible for data cleaning and on how various roles
will be acknowledged
Discussions and decisions relating to data sharing remain ongoing and guidelines should be agreed on in advance of the next
outbreak.
4. Analysing data and reporting results in an appropriate manner
The scientific community should agree on guidelines for epidemic modelling and analyses (such as those in place for report-
ing experimental studies), such as:
— assumptions underlying analyses should be clearly stated
— sensitivity to these assumptions should be tested
— uncertainty in results should be adequately explored and reported
These are particularly relevant for reporting epidemic projections.
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these heterogeneities can help target resources appropriately
and compare different care regimens. For less severe emerging
pathogens, the case definition typically only encompasses a
small fraction of all infected individuals, and hence the infec-
tion fatality rate (i.e. the proportion of infected individuals
who die, rather than the proportion of cases who die—as per
the case definition, which may not be equivalent to infection)
may be a more useful measure of severity [30].
(ii) Short- and long-term incidence projections
Short-term impact of an outbreak can be assessed by predict-
ing the number of cases that will arise in the next few days or
weeks. This is particularly relevant for evaluation of immedi-
ate health-care capacity needs. Projections of future incidence
and estimates of the doubling time (the time taken for the
incidence to double) can be obtained by extrapolating the
early time series of reported cases either obtained from aggre-
gated surveillance data or calculated from individual records
[31]. These projections typically rely on the assumption that
incidence initially grows exponentially [31]. They are subject
to uncertainty, which increases the further one looks into the
future. Quantifying and appropriately reporting such uncer-
tainty and underlying assumptions are crucial [22,25,32,33].
Overstating uncertainty can lead to inappropriately pessi-
mistic projections, which may in turn be detrimental to the
control of the outbreak [34]. On the other hand, understating
uncertainty prevents policymakers from making decisions
based on the whole spectrum of possible impacts. Some
studies have already discussed how to find the balance
data assessing impact feasibility of control improving
inter-
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Figure 1. Schematic illustrating the data needed to answer questions at different stages of the epidemic to inform the response. Asterisk indicates that analysis is
only possible if aggregate counts are stratified. Footnote: Where two cells in a column are merged, either or both types of data may be used. CFR, case fatality ratio.
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between these two extremes [35–37]. Here, we propose two
simple rules of thumb for projecting case numbers. First, pro-
jections should not be made for more than two or three
generations of cases into the future. Second, central projec-
tions should be shown together with lower and upper
bounds. In the future, the modelling community should
agree on guidelines for reporting epidemic projections, as
are already in place for reporting experimental studies [38].
A number of factors can lead to incidence not growing
exponentially. In particular, this happens once herd immunity
accumulates, if population behaviour changes or as a result of
the implementation of interventions. Dynamic transmission
models, which account for saturation effects, can be used to
assess the long-term impact of the outbreak such as predicting
the timing and magnitude of the epidemic peak or the attack
rate (final proportion of population infected) [39,40]. However,
these models are hard to parametrize as they require infor-
mation on population size and immunity, interventions
(if any) and potential behavioural changes over time, all of
which may be subject to uncertainty [41,42]. We discuss these
issues in more detail in §3. Projecting longer term is likely to
be associated with a large degree of uncertainty and these pro-
jections may be more useful for evaluating qualitative trends
and evaluating intervention choices rather than predicting
exact case numbers.
(b) How feasible is controlling the outbreak and what
interventions would be appropriate?
Interventions to reduce transmission can include community
mobilization, quarantine, isolation, treatment or vaccination.
The potential success of these interventions is determined
by general characteristics of the disease such as overall
transmissibility and how this varies across populations [43].
Furthermore, certain types of interventions may be more or
less appropriate depending on the natural history of the
disease and the context of the epidemic.
(i) Overall transmissibility
The transmissibility of a pathogen determines the intensity of
interventions needed to achieve epidemic control [44]. The
parameter most often used to quantify transmissibility is
the reproduction number (R), the mean number of secondary
cases infected by a single individual. This parameter has an
intuitive interpretation: if R. 1, then the epidemic is likely
to grow, whereas if R, 1, the epidemic will decline [44,45].
The final attack rate (proportion of the population infected)
of an epidemic also depends on the value of R at the start
of an epidemic (termed R0 if the population has no immu-
nity). R can be estimated from the incidence of reported
cases, given knowledge of the serial interval distribution
(i.e. distribution of time between symptom onset in a case
and symptom onset in his/her infector; see §2b(iii)) [46–49].
(ii) Transmission heterogeneities
Heterogeneity in the number of secondary cases generated by
each infected individual affects epidemic establishment and
the ease of control. Greater heterogeneity reduces the
chance of an outbreak emerging from a single case [50]. How-
ever, this heterogeneity can make an established outbreak
hard to control using mass interventions, as a single uncon-
trolled case can generate a large number of secondary cases
[50]. Conversely, heterogeneity in transmission may provide
opportunities for targeting interventions if the individuals
who contribute more to transmission (because of environ-
mental, behavioural and/or biological factors [51–53]) share
socio-demographic or geographical characteristics that can be
identified [50,54]. Reconstruction of transmission trees (who
infects whom) can provide an understanding of who contrib-
utes more to transmission. This can be done using detailed
case investigations and/or using genetic data [55–58].
Environmental, behavioural and biological factors may
also lead to groups of individuals being disproportionately
more likely to acquire infection (e.g. children during influenza
outbreaks [53,59] or health-care workers (HCWs) during Ebola
outbreaks [60,61]). To identify whether such groups exist and
target them appropriately, the proportion infected in each
group must be estimated. This requires population size esti-
mates for the different groups, which may be difficult to
obtain, as we highlight §3c.
Spatial heterogeneity in transmission is particularly inter-
esting to assess as it can inform the targeting of surveillance
and interventions to the geographical areas most at risk.
Phylo-geographical studies based on genetic data can improve
understanding of the geographical origins of the outbreak,
identify and characterize sub-outbreaks and quantify whether
transmission is very local or travels large distances [22,62,63].
Results of such analyses can be used to determine the appropri-
ate spatial scale of control measures. Spatially explicit epidemic
models can also be used to quantify the risk of exportation
of the infection from one place to another. This can help
public health officials to tailor prevention and control resources
to the level of risk likely to be experienced by a given area.
Such models typically require detailed data on mobility
patterns and immunity levels of the populations in the areas
of interest [64–66].
(iii) Delay distributions
Disease natural history fundamentally affects outbreak
dynamics. The generation time distribution (i.e. distribution of
time between infection of an index case and infection of its sec-
ondary cases) determines—with the reproductionnumber—the
growth rate of an epidemic [67].Most commonly, the generation
time distribution is estimated from data on the serial interval
distribution of an infection—the delay between symptom
onset in a case and symptom onset in his/her infector. Other
delays between events in the natural history of infection
(e.g. exposure, onset of symptoms, hospitalization and recovery
or death) also affect disease transmission or have implications
for control [43,67]. Delays from symptom onset to recovery (or
death) will determine the required duration of health-care and
case isolation. The incubation period (the delay between infec-
tion and symptom onset of a case) and the extent to which
infectiousnessprecedes symptomonsetwilldetermine the feasi-
bility and effectiveness of contact tracing or prophylaxis [43].
Estimating these delay distributions requires detailed data on
individual cases and their exposure, e.g. through transmission
pairs identified in household studies [43].
(iv) Intervention choice
Other analyses can also help refine the type of interventions
that should be considered. Ecological associations between
transmissibility (measured by R) at a fine spatio-temporal
scale and any covariate measured at the same scale, may be
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of interest. For instance, analyses of the West African Ebola
epidemic showed that districts with lower reported funeral
attendance and faster hospitalization experienced lower
transmissibility, highlighting the effectiveness of promoting
safe burials and early hospitalization [10].
However, interpreting the results of such analyses can be
challenging, as they might be prone to bias and confounding.
Efficacy (which measures the impact of an intervention under
ideal and controlled circumstances) and effectiveness (which
measures the impact of an intervention under real-world con-
ditions) of an intervention (e.g. vaccine) are best measured
in a trial setting (either individual- or cluster-randomized
[68–70]). However, performing trials to evaluate the com-
parative impact of different multi-intervention packages is
impractical. Dynamic epidemic models, where the interven-
tions of interest can be explicitly incorporated, allow the
impact of such intervention packages to be predicted [71].
However, outputs of such models are strongly determined
by the underlying assumptions and parameter values.
Hence they require careful parametrization, supported by
data such as intervention efficacy and the size, infectivity,
susceptibility and mixing of different groups [72,73]. These
parameters may not be straightforward to estimate, as we
discuss in §3 using examples from the West African Ebola
epidemic.
Another factor determining the appropriate choice of inter-
ventions is their cost, combinations of interventions with
higher effectiveness at lower cost (i.e. higher cost-effectiveness)
being preferable. Economic analyses combined with math-
ematical models can help to evaluate the optimal resource
allocation among both current available interventions and
potential new interventions, accounting for development and
testing costs for the latter. Indirect costs, e.g. those associated
with a restricted workforce following school closures [74], or
trade limitations from air-travel restrictions [75], also need
to be considered. While economic analyses have played an
important role in designing optimal intervention packages
for endemic diseases such as HIV and malaria [76,77], such
analyses are more difficult to perform during an epidemic,
when cost data might be unavailable and uncertain, costs
may vary rapidly over time and ethical considerations suggest
interventions should be implemented immediately.
(c) Are current interventions effective and could they be
improved?
Tracking changes in estimates of key epidemiological par-
ameters over the course of an outbreak enhances situational
awareness. It also allows the impact of interventions to be
assessed as they are implemented, although disentangling
the effects of different interventions carried out simultaneously
may be challenging.
3. Data requirements
Obtaining reliable estimates of the epidemiological parameters
detailed above requires a wide range of data, such as incidence
time series and detailed case information (figure 1). Here, we
explain how these can be obtained from various sources, with
the objective to help improve data collection systems in prep-
aration for future outbreaks. We use Ebola as a specific example
throughout this section, commenting on the strengths and
limitationsof thedatacollectedduring theWestAfricanepidemic.
We distinguish data needs at the individual level, the
exposure level and the population level.
(a) Individual-level data: case line-list
Simple analyses can be performed solely using incidence time
series, from surveillance designed to capture aggregate case
counts. However, individual case reports provide much richer
information, essential to estimate many of the key parameters
outlined above (e.g. characterization of delay distributions).
Such data are typically stored in a case database or ‘line-list’—
a table with one line containing individual data for each case.
Themore data recorded on each case, themore detailed the ana-
lyses canbe. In theEbola epidemic, demographic characteristics,
spatial location, laboratory results and clinical details such as
symptoms, hospitalization status, treatment and outcome, and
dates associated with these were reported for at least a subset
of cases. The appropriate information to collect may vary
depending on the disease: for Ebola, dates of isolation and fun-
eral were relevant. Comprehensive demographic information
can be used to determine risk factors for transmission or severity
of infection and to project case numbers stratified by demo-
graphic characteristics. Detailed information also helps to
identify and merge any duplicate entries in a line-list, which
may occur when the same person visits multiple health centres
over the course of illness, for instance. Finally, information on
how each case was detected—for example, through hospitaliz-
ation, or via contact tracing—can aid assessment of how
representative the data are and allow subsequent adjustment
for bias [28]; however, this was not available for Ebola.
Cases in the line-list should be classified using standar-
dized case definitions, which is sometimes difficult for
outbreaks of new pathogens, or where different case defi-
nitions are provided by different organizations (e.g. World
Health Organization (WHO) and US Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC)) [78]. For the Ebola response,
although the WHO released official case definitions of con-
firmed, probable and suspected Ebola cases [79], different
countries adopted different testing strategies, thereby limiting
the opportunity for inter-country comparison. For example,
in Guinea deceased individuals were not tested for Ebola,
meaning these individuals were never classified as confirmed
cases, unlike in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Encouraging use of
a consistent testing protocol and case definition, and ensuring
transparency in what is used where and when, would
improve the validity of subsequent analyses.
Laboratory testing of clinical specimens is key for confirm-
ing cases and test results should be linked to the line-list.
Understanding diagnostic test performance in field conditions
is important; cross-validation of diagnostic sensitivity and
specificity between laboratories is useful to assess the extent
to which observed differences in case incidence may be
explained by variations in laboratory conditions and practices.
In addition, recording raw test results with the case classi-
fication may help evaluation of diagnostic performance.
Ebola cases were defined as confirmed cases once Ebola
virus RNAwas isolated from clinical specimens using reverse
transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR [79]).
Within each of the main affected countries, field laboratories
were established [80,81] to enable prompt diagnosis of cases.
Recent evidence suggests that the large fluctuations in
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temperature and humidity to which these laboratories were
subjected reduced the test performance compared with
manufacturer evaluation reports [82].
During the West African Ebola epidemic, the case line-list
contained a large quantity of data collected from reported
cases. The information allowed estimation of the CFR, the
incubation period distribution (and evaluation of differences
in these by age and gender) and the reproduction number
[3,4,6]. Projections of the likely scale of the outbreak were also
made, either from the line-list or from aggregated case counts
[3,8,83,84]. There were regular data updates [5], with a total of
over 19 000 confirmed and probable cases reported, which
allowed analyses to be updated as more data became available.
(b) Exposure-level data
Data on exposures allow cases to be linked to their potential
sources of infection, and hence provide a better understanding
of transmission characteristics.
(i) Transmission pairs
The relevant modes (e.g. airborne, foodborne) and pathways
(e.g. animal–human, human–human) of transmission may be
identified using information on exposure reported by cases.
Cases can report contact bothwith sick individuals (their poten-
tial source of infection) and healthy individuals they have
contacted since becoming ill (who may need to be traced and
monitored as potential new cases). These data will be more
informative if the majority of infections are symptomatic (and
hence easily identifiable), if individuals are mostly infectious
after the onset of symptoms [43] and if the time window over
which exposures and contacts are monitored is as long as the
upper bound of the incubation period distribution. If exposure
information is collected with enough demographic information
to allow record linkage, these backward and forward contacts
can be identified in the case line-list, defining transmission
pairs. Depending on the mutation rate of the pathogen, genetic
data can also be used to identify or confirm these epidemiologi-
cal links [56,85]. The increasing availability of full genome
pathogen sequences offers exciting prospects in that respect.
Some genetic sequence information was available during the
Ebola epidemic, but most sequences could not be linked to
case records, limiting the use of sequence data in this context.
On the other hand, individuals who were named as potential
sources of infection could often be identified in the case line-
list, although this process was hindered by non-unique names
and limited demographic information collected on the potential
sources [10]. These exposure data were used to characterize
variation in transmission over the course of infection [10], and
to estimate the serial interval and the incubation period [3].
The upper bound of the incubation period distributionwas esti-
mated to be 21 days [3], which supported monitoring contacts
for up to three weeks.
(ii) Transmission studies
Studies of transmission in well-defined, small settings such as
households are useful to quantify asymptomatic transmission,
infectivity over time and the serial interval as they capture
explicitly the number and timing of secondary cases. Addition-
ally, these studies can estimate the secondary attack rate (the
proportion of contacts of a case who become infected within
one incubation period), which can be used to characterize het-
erogeneities in transmission of different groups [59]. Estimates
of the secondary attack rate have been obtained for the West
African Ebola epidemic by reconstructing household data
based on information reported by cases, in particular, as part
of contact-tracing activities [86,87].
(c) Population-level or metadata
Although they might not immediately appear as useful as
individual- or exposure-level data, metadata are crucial for
answering many public health questions.
(i) Population sizes
Knowing the sizes of affected populations is important for
quantifying the attack rate and informing dynamic trans-
mission models. Census data are likely to be the most
reliable source, but may be infrequently collected. Methods
based on interpreting satellite imagery [88,89] can inform
population size and structure, although demographic stratifi-
cations are not always available. For the West African Ebola
epidemic, the most recently available age- and gender-
stratified population census data were from 1996 in Guinea
[90], 2004 in Sierra Leone [91] and 2008 in Liberia [92].
A particular population of interest is HCWs who, due to
their contact with patients, are often at high risk of infection
and may also be high-risk transmitters. Large numbers of
HCWs were infected during the West African Ebola epidemic
[60,61]. However, the proportion of HCWs affected at different
stages of the outbreak and the relative risk of acquisition for the
HCWs compared with the general population could not be
estimated since the total number of HCWs was not systemati-
cally reported and changed during the course of the outbreak
with the scale-up of interventions. Note that, depending on
the transmission route, the definition of HCWs may need to
include anyone working in a health-care setting who could
be at risk (e.g. cleaners may be exposed to bodily fluids).
(ii) Mobility
Characterizing population movement is crucial to assessing
the risk of exportation of the infection from one place to
another. Air-travel data are the most reliable, consistently
available and commonly used data source to inform models
of long-distance spread [93]. Such data were widely used
during the West African Ebola epidemic to quantify the
risk of international spread of the disease, and to assess the
potential impact of airport screening and travel restrictions
on the outbreak [9,94–96].
However, air travel does not cover other population move-
ments that may play an important role in disease spread, e.g.
travel by road or on foot in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone
and across the porous country borders during the West African
Ebola epidemic [97]. Usually, little data are available to directly
characterize these typically smaller-scale movements. Gravity
models, which assume that connectivity between two places
depends on their population sizes and the distance between
them, canbeused toquantifyspatial connectivitybetweendiffer-
ent regions [98–101], and have proved useful to predict local
epidemic spread, e.g. forChikungunya [98]. Suchmodels require
data on population sizes and geographical distances.
Recently, mobile phone data have been explored as an
alternative source of data on mobility patterns, which could
be used to predict spatial epidemic spread [102–104]. How-
ever, a number of challenges (in particular related to
privacy issues) meant that such data were unavailable to
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understand the regional and local spread of the West African
Ebola epidemic [105]. In addition, inter-country movement is
not captured from these data. At a national level, the utility of
mobile phone data may depend on whether mobile phone
users are representative of the population contributing to
transmission, the level of mobile phone coverage in the
affected population and whether population movement is
likely to remain the same during an epidemic compared to
the time period of the data.
(iii) Seroprevalence
Assessing seroprevalence in a population affected by an out-
break can provide valuable information on the underlying
scale of population exposure and insight into how interven-
tions might be targeted. For instance, if there is pre-existing
population immunity prior to an outbreak that varies with
age (as was the case in the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic),
vaccination could be targeted at those with lower pre-existing
immunity. Dynamic transmission models incorporating such
differences in susceptibility can be used to explore different
targeting strategies [106].
Ideally, serological surveys would be undertaken to quan-
tify seroprevalence [107]; however, they are expensive and not
performed on a regular basis. In the absence of such data, infor-
mation on historical outbreaks and vaccine use can sometimes
be used to infer seroprevalence [108]. Serological studies
performed before and after an epidemic can also be useful to
measure the attack rate and the scale of the outbreak, and
hence provide information on the level of underreporting
during the outbreak [109].
It was widely assumed that the population in West Africa
was entirely susceptible to Ebola at the start of this outbreak,
with no known previous outbreaks in the area. However,
some studies have suggested that there might have been
low levels of prior immunity [110].
(iv) Recording intervention efforts across time and space
During an outbreak, multiple interventions are often imple-
mented by different groups and organizations. Evaluating
the role of interventions in interrupting transmission is impor-
tant for revising and improving efforts, but it is challenging
without detailed quantitative information of what has been
implemented where and when [111,112]. Maintaining a
systematic real-time record of the different interventions at a
fine spatio-temporal scale would help, e.g. the number and
location of health-care facilities and their personnel, number
of beds, vaccine or treatment coverage and details of local com-
munity mobilization. Developing centralized platforms to
routinely record such data once a large-scale outbreak is under-
way is probably unfeasible. However, developing such tools in
advance of outbreaks (such as those developed for the Global
Polio Eradication Initiative [113] and those recently developed
to collect health-care facility data [114]) should be a priority
since better information to evaluate intervention policies in
real time will allow for more optimal resource allocation.
During the West African Ebola epidemic, many data on
interventions were recorded at a local level by some of the
numerous partners (e.g. non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and other organizations) involved in the response.
For example, some data were collected on the number and
capacity of hospitals over time [115] and these were used in
a study modelling community transmission to assess the
impact of increasing hospital bed capacity [116]. However,
the decentralization of the response meant that intervention
data were not systematically reported or collated and these
data were not shared widely with the research community. A
failure to report interventions centrally and systematically
can make it difficult to disentangle a lack of intervention
effect from a lack of intervention implementation. This can par-
ticularly be a problemwhen numerous groups coordinate their
own efforts, making it impossible to draw firm conclusions
about interventions. In the absence of detailed data on inter-
vention efforts in West Africa, multiple studies have assessed
the combined impact of all interventions in place, by compar-
ing transmissibility in the early phase (with no intervention)
to that in the later phases [87,117]. However, this approach pro-
vides less compelling evidence of a causal effect and does not
disentangle the impact of different interventions performed
at the same time, and hence is less informative for future
response planning.
(v) Quantifying intervention efficacy
Vaccine or treatment trials together with case–control and
cohort studies can be useful in assessing the impact of an inter-
vention. For example, during the West African Ebola epidemic
therewas anurgent need to estimate the efficacyof newlydevel-
oped vaccines. Trials such as the Guinea Ebola c¸a suffit vaccine
trial [118] provided key data on the effectiveness of the rVSV-
ZEBOV Ebola vaccine [119,120]. These trials occurred at the
tail end of the epidemic and results will be useful in future out-
breaks. Statistical power from trials will be maximized by
implementing such studies as early as possible in future out-
breaks. This will be facilitated if research on diagnostics,
drugs and vaccines is promoted between, and not only
during, outbreaks, e.g. through new initiatives such as the
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation [121].
(vi) Quantifying data completeness and timeliness
All of thedata sourcesmentionedaboveare inevitably imperfect;
what they are trying to measure is different from what they
measure in practice. Quantifying the mismatch between the
two is vital to appropriately account for these imperfections.
For instance, case line-lists are likely to contain information
on only a proportion of all infected individuals: typically those
with symptoms, or those who sought care. The level of report-
ing may also be influenced by the capacity of the local health
systems, which can vary over time and space. During the
West African Ebola epidemic, less than a third of cases were
estimated to be reported [122] and severe cases were probably
over-represented compared to mild cases. At the end of 2014,
health-care capacity was exceeded in many parts of Guinea,
Liberia and Sierra Leone [14], but new health-care facilities
were subsequently built; hence the line-list of cases is likely
to be more complete towards the end of the outbreak. Under-
reporting might also have been higher in this compared to
previous Ebola outbreaks, during which the health-care sys-
tems were less overburdened. Systematic evaluation of the
surveillance system [123] over different spatial units and time
periods could help inform the level of underreporting. In
addition, joint analysis of genetic sequence and surveillance
data can provide insight into the degree of underreporting
[124]. Quantifying completeness of, and potential biases in
the line-list is important, e.g. to adequately quantify the CFR
[28]. Although differences in the CFR were observed across
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different health-care facilities in the West African Ebola epi-
demic, it was not possible to determine whether these were
due to reporting differences or underlying differences between
settings [125].
Similarly, exposure-level data can be incomplete, depending
on the available capacity (personnel and resources) to perform
contact tracing and the willingness of people to share infor-
mation on their contacts. Complete data can be used to assess
the route of transmission—animal to human or human to
human—and thenumberof cases imported fromother locations.
If data are incomplete, these estimates may be incorrect.
Population-level data may suffer the same issues. For
instance, the recording of intervention efforts (e.g. the
number of personal protection equipment (PPE) kits distribu-
ted) can differ from the reality of the intervention (e.g. the
number of people who used PPE in practice). Quantifying
this mismatch is crucial to evaluating the impact of various
interventions, and requires dedicated studies, with both quali-
tative and quantitative components, on the acceptability of and
the adherence to given interventions. Such studies have been
carried out in the past, e.g. to assess the potential impact of
facemasks on the risk of influenza transmission in households,
or of condom use on the risk of HIV transmission [126–128].
It is also important to quantify delays encountered in the
reporting of cases [129]. During the West African Ebola epi-
demic, there were delays in all databases and disparities
between different data sources. In particular, comparison
between the line-list of cases and aggregated daily case
counts reported by the affected countries highlighted report-
ing delays in the line-list. As a result, at any point in the
outbreak, naive time series of case counts derived from the
line-list suggested that the epidemic was declining, due to
right-censoring. Comparison between the line-list and
reported aggregated case counts (which were more up-to-
date) and between successive versions of the line-list allowed
the reporting delays to be quantified. Analyses such as the
projected incidence could then be adjusted accordingly [5].
4. Successes and challenges in data collection
and analyses during the West African Ebola
epidemic
In summary, the enormous quantity of detailed data collected
during the West African Ebola epidemic played an invaluable
role in guiding response efforts. However, several analyses
could not be performed. Early on, severity, transmissibility
and delay distributions were quantified and short-term projec-
tions were made, based on the case line-list and/or contact
tracing data [3,5,7]. Some heterogeneity in severity and trans-
missibility could be identified (e.g. by age and viraemia
[7,10,116,125,130–132]), but other types of heterogeneity
could not be assessed. For example, it was not possible to com-
pare theCFR between hospitalized and non-hospitalized cases,
because of biases in theway cases were recorded in the line-list
[28]. Long-term projections were extremely challenging due to
large uncertainty in population sizes, behaviour changes and
changing intervention efforts. In addition, the relative risk of
Ebola acquisition for HCWs was difficult to estimate due to
the absence of reliable spatio-temporal data on the number of
HCWs. Finally, systematic evaluation of interventions was
not feasible due to multiple control measures being carried
out at the same time, with little central recording of details of
each intervention.
5. Optimizing data quality
Data collection during the West African Ebola epidemic was
possible, in part, due to a pre-existing case investigation form
and data management system (Epi Info viral haemorrhagic
fever (VHF) application [133,134]). For outbreaks of new
pathogens, such systems are not usually in place. The list of
data needs we have outlined above, based on our experience
during the Ebola epidemic, could serve as a basis for data col-
lection in future outbreaks. Herewe outline improvements that
could be made to streamline data collection, minimize delays
between data collection and data dissemination, and improve
data quality during future outbreaks. All of these are necessary
for timely analysis to inform the response in real time. We
consider this particularly for line-list and exposure data.
(a) Streamlining data collection and digitalization
Data need to be digitized before they can be analysed;
streamlining this process reduces the potential for delays and
errors. Using electronic data capture on tablets or phones
may reduce delays and errors compared with using paper
forms that then require manual digitization, with its
contingent issues [135–138]. Electronic questionnaires may
not be available at the start of the epidemic, but could be
quickly adopted using available tools (e.g. EpiCollect [139] or
EpiBasket [140]). Interpretation problems (e.g. abbreviations)
and spelling errors could also be minimized at the data collec-
tion level by using multiple choice questions rather than free
text and at the data entry level by using drop-down menus.
For example, for spatial information the choices could be the
standard administrative levels used in the country—such as
district or county. As response efforts evolve over time, such
as the building of new treatment centres, the lists would be
updated as required. Similarly, using pop-out calendars to
select dates would limit typing errors. Additionally, internal
consistency checks could flag problems such as the recorded
date of death being before that of symptom onset, and the
system could force a manual check before the record is saved.
In the West African Ebola epidemic, data were collected
using paper forms (electronic supplementary material,
figures S1–S3) and manually entered into an electronic
system at local operation centres. Data entry problems were
particularly noticeable in clinical dates and free text variables,
such as district locations and hospital names, and required
considerable cleaning (e.g. to correct spelling errors) [3,5,10].
(b) Ensuring adequate logistical resources and training
With any data system there is potential for delays in data entry
and dissemination due to limitations in personnel and hard-
ware, and logistical constraints in data delivery (e.g. reliable
electricity, Internet access and transport). Although the latter
limitations are arguably outside the scope of outbreak control,
delays from data collection to dissemination could be reduced
by increasing training in data entry and providing more data
entry facilities where possible. Delays in data entry and release
during the Ebola epidemic meant that real-time analyses of the
line-list data could not be performed on fully up-to-date data.
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(c) Acknowledging the international nature of the
threat
In the world today, an epidemic emerging anywhere is a
global threat due to high population connectivity [141,142]
and, as such, a response will have to operate across multiple
languages. Ideally, the same data entry system would be used
in every affected country to allow easy collation into a single
case line-list. However, a global response requires careful trans-
lation of the questions and the system to ensure theymake sense
and are identical in every language. Additionally, different
languages, dialects or alphabets could be challenging due to
differing pronunciations, accents, alternate names or spellings,
and these should be acknowledged in the form design. The
language barrier was not a major problem during the Ebola
response: Guinea had a form in French, while in Sierra Leone
and Liberia the form was in English, though there were some
minor differences in formulations between the two (for example
the English version of the form asked ‘In the past one month
prior to symptom onset: did the patient have contact with
(. . .) any sick person before becoming ill’ (see §4 in the form
in electronic supplementary material, figure S1), while the
French form did not specify ‘before becoming ill’).
(d) Improving harmonization between databases
Analysis of laboratory results and sequence data can be much
more powerful if they can be dated and linked to the epide-
miological data recorded for each case. In the early stages
of the Ebola response, there were reports that laboratory
results could not always be linked to case records as labels
were incorrectly written or damaged in transit [81]. Later in
the epidemic, case report forms came with pre-printed
unique ID barcode stickers to label all records and samples
for each case (electronic supplementary material, Form S2).
This would be useful if implemented early in future out-
breaks, particularly if laboratory tests are not performed at
the point of care. Rapid diagnostic tests were developed
during the West African Ebola epidemic but not used
widely [143,144]; similarly, mobile sequence tests were intro-
duced later in the epidemic [145]: both of these would reduce
delays and maximize the potential to link patient data.
6. Data availability
We have described a set of data needed to perform analyses
to inform the public health response during an outbreak. We
have proposed strategies to ensure fast and high-quality data
collection, to enable robust and timely analyses. However,
such analyses can only be performed if the data are accessible
to data analysts and modellers.
(a) Data access
The West African Ebola epidemic has prompted an ongoing
public debate about the ethical, practical and scientific
implications of wide data access [14,146–148]. Ethical con-
siderations require removal of data that might compromise
anonymity, but such detailed information might be required
to answer important public health questions. Mechanisms
also need to be found to appropriately acknowledge those
who collected and digitalized the data. From a scientific
perspective, having several groups analysing the data is
desirable, as independent analyses leading to similar results
will reinforce their utility for policymaking [3,8]. Such paralle-
lized efforts have been formalized through consortiums of
highly experienced groups, e.g. for modelling of HIV [149],
influenza [150,151] and malaria [152]. However, if results
differ, understanding what assumptions drive these differ-
ences may confuse and delay the process of decision-making.
A consequence of data sharing, therefore, needs to be an
increased emphasis on evidence synthesis, such as systematic
reviews of the different analyses. To enable this process,
groups should explicitly state all assumptions underlying
their analyses and which data they are based on. Like the orig-
inal analyses, reviews need to be timely to be useful. These
issues have partly been addressed through new data avail-
ability policies [153]. Furthermore, this process would ideally
be performed by a group independent of those performing
the primary analyses. Identifying an effective system, appro-
priate personnel and appropriate recognition for this
important role needs to be planned in advance of future
outbreaks.
(b) Data curating and data cleaning
Data from theWestAfricanEbola epidemic required significant
cleaning before it could be analysed, and this was necessary for
every updated dataset, i.e. every few days during the peak.
Were outbreak data to be shared more widely, collaborative
or centralized cleaning would be optimal, to avoid repetition
and ensure consistency across different groups. If a centralized
effortwasnot possible, regular sharing of the cleaning code and
cleaned datasets between groups would facilitate comparison
of results. Even better, code could be shared on a collaborative
platform such as Github (https://github.com/), leading to a
common clean dataset being actively maintained by the scien-
tific community. However, for this process to be effective, a
set of best practices would need to be established in advance,
such as designing a transparent workflow, establishing a fair
distribution of tasks and clarifying how credit will be given
for this (often lengthy) task. This is important to avoid dupli-
cation of effort and allow effective collaboration. As the
process of data sharing is debated further, it is critical that the
practicalities of data cleaning are discussed in parallel. Based
on our experience, a centralized cleaning platform would be
the most effective method.
(c) Disseminating results of data analyses
Finally, analyses will be most useful if they are shared widely
across policymakers, local health teams and other research
groups. The format for dissemination could be anything from
a report to a scientific publication.Reports canbemadeavailable
faster and regularly updated but donot undergo thepeer review
process of publications. Peer review can delay publication,
though there are now new platforms for fast-tracking this pro-
cess [154,155]. At the time of writing, as interest in Zika virus
is gaining momentum, there seems to be an encouraging trend
to the use of pre-print servers [156,157].
7. Discussion
By the very nature of emerging infectious diseases, we do
not know which pathogen will emerge next, when or
where. There have been many suggestions about how to be
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better prepared [11–21,24,26]; here, we argue that prepared-
ness should include development of a broad-use data
collection system that can be easily and quickly adapted to
any disease (in agreement with [11]) as well as the regular
collection of population health data in centralized systems.
Different infectious diseases may require different types of
data [140]: a single approach is not applicable to all diseases.
In particular, different interventions may need to be recorded
for different diseases.
Data collection and management may need to evolve as
the outbreak progresses and/or as more is learnt about the
pathogen: the Ebola data collection forms changed late in
2014 to streamline collection and entry when the response
effort was almost overwhelmed with cases (electronic sup-
plementary material, figures S1 and S2). Similarly, both for
Ebola and the recent Zika outbreak, reports of sexual trans-
mission have led to a broadening of the contact tracing and
exposure information collected.
The data collected during the Ebola epidemic allowed
many analyses to be performed, which informed the response.
However, as in many outbreak situations, it has not been
possible to systematically quantify the relative contribution of
different interventions (such as safe burials, hospitalization,
contact tracing and community mobilization) in reducing
transmission. This is because data on where and when these
interventions took place were not centrally recorded and
released in a timely fashion. Efforts have been made to collate
some information from Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea [115];
however, this commenced late in the epidemic. As this effort
relies on different organizations to contribute data, the sub-
missions are in different formats and are unlikely to provide
comprehensive information. In the midst of a global public
health crisis resources are often deployed favouring implemen-
tation rather than documentation of interventions. However,
wewould argue that securing some resources to monitor inter-
ventions—especially during the early stages—is critical to
optimally prioritizing future control efforts.
Some of the data we have suggested to be collected during
outbreaks may not be obviously useful at the field or case
management level, e.g. detailed demographic characteristics
of cases and contacts. Collecting such data costs money and
time as well as trained personnel. These three ‘resources’ are
limited and, during an epidemic, should be prioritized where
their need is greatest. However, from a population perspective,
collecting these datamay help quantify epidemic impact, assist
in the design and evaluation of interventions, and help prevent
new infections. Further studies might examine how to appro-
priately balance these two considerations.
We have built on the Ebola experience to draw up a list of
the data needed to assist the response throughout an epi-
demic, which should help to collect relevant data in a
standardized effort in future epidemics. To make the most
of these data, epidemiologists and modellers should work
now to develop tools to automatically clean, analyse and
report on the data in a more timely and robust manner
[158]. Based on critical review of past outbreak analyses,
future studies could flag common methodological mistakes
and propose good practice [159]. This includes clearly stating
all assumptions underlying a model or analysis and ensuring
that parametrization is either directly informed by relevant
data or has appropriate sensitivity analyses, with correspond-
ing uncertainty clearly reported [32,160].
Improving our ability to respond effectively to the next out-
break will require collaboration between all parties involved in
outbreak response: those in the field, epidemiologists, model-
lers and policymakers as well as the populations affected.
Here we have given the data analyst perspective on what
data are required to answer important policy questions. It is
equally important that other perspectives should be heard to
be better prepared for and improve interactions during crises,
thereby minimizing the impact of future outbreaks.
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